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Loretta Lynn v. Sure-Fire Music Com-
pany.  United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit.  2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14050.
“My daddy worked all night in the Van 
Lear coal mines
“All day long in the field a hoin’ corn”
Ah yes, Loretta Lynn, coal miner’s daugh-
ter from Butcher Hollow, Kentucky.  And 
Daddy indeed died of black lung. 
And she married at 15, launched her career 
in 1953 with a $17 Harmony guitar, became 
a Nashville fixture with 16 number-one hits.
In 1961, Lynn contracted with Sure-Fire 
Music Company, giving them world-wide 
copyright interests in her songs in exchange 
for royalties.  In 1966, they re-executed with 
one big difference.  If there was a change of 
ownership of Sure-Fire, the contract “shall be 
null and void.”
i.e., better the bandits you know …
By 2003, the original Sure-Fire owner 
brothers were out and other family members 
in.  Lynn filed in state court for a whole bunch 
of stuff.
To wit: declaratory judgment that contract 
void;  recover master recordings;  breach of 
contract for failing to renew copyrights and 
failing to collect foreign royalties and other in-
juries, all of which were contract or tort claims.
The state court said it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction as the Copyright Act preempted the 
claims.  She had to go to federal court.
So Lynn refiled in federal court asserting 
the same claims.
Of course the opinion says “Lynn.”  It was 
her lawyer.  She was busy writing “Don’t Come 
Home A’Drinkin’.”  And I’m sure her lawyer 
had a delightful time explaining what happened 
next because clients are always so reasonable.
Sure-Fire moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that Lynn was asserting state law claims and 
she should be arguing copyright.  And the fed-
eral district court dismissed saying Copyright 
did not preempt and they had no subject matter 
jurisdiction.
Sure-Fire then appealed, insisting that 
Lynn’s claims lay in copyright.  And we go 
to the Sixth Circuit which hears appeals from 
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee. 
It sits in Cincinnati in solemn, black-robed 
majesty at the Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse.
A federal court has jurisdiction if the com-
plaint invokes federal law.  Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Duh.
Lynn’s complaint had 
no federal law.  It was all 
contract law.  But is the com-
plaint, as Sure-Fire insisted, 
preempted by Copyright 
Law?
And what was Sure-
Fire’s strategy?  Were they 
so insistent on copyright 
because they hadn’t violated copyright?
As you’re about to see, Lynn’s lawyer did 
the thing right from the get-go and has gotten 
totally jerked around and stalled.
Preemption can only happen if (1) the work 
is within the scope of the “subject matter of 
copyright” which the songs were;  and (2) her 
state law rights are equivalent to any exclusive 
rights within copyright per 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 
453 (6th Cir. 2001).
Rights protected under Copyright are 
to: (1) reproduce the work;  (2) prepare 
derivative works;  (3) distribute copies; 
(4) in the case of music, to perform it; 
(5) in the case of sound recordings, to 
perform by digital audio transmission. 
Lynn wanted her recordings back 
and her foreign royalties paid over. 
She had to prove the formation and 
breach of a contract.
So the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal. 
But back in state court, she would have to 
appeal their dismissal.  Ye-gads.
Perhaps inspiring her to write “Full Circle.” 
And for her attorney, “All I Want From You Is 
Away.”  
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QUESTION:  A university librarian asks 
about linking to copyrighted content and 
whether there is any liability when a library 
provides such links.
ANSWER:  In the United States, it is 
settled law that a search engine’s linking to 
copyrighted content is not infringement.  A 
couple of cases from the 9th Circuit U.S. 
Court of Appeals settled the matter.  See Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 
2003) and Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).  The cases 
held that the links actually direct searchers to 
the copyright holder’s website where the full-
size photographic image is stored.  Google 
did not store the images.  Therefore, linking 
is not direct infringement.  The Perfect 10 
court also found that a search engine’s link-
ing could be contributory infringement if the 
search engine’s owners had knowledge that 
the infringing Perfect 10 images were on its 
website and did nothing to take simple steps 
to prevent further damage to the plaintiff.  The 
court went on to find that there was no vicar-
ious liability because the search engine had 
no ability to police the infringing activities of 
third-party websites. 
The situation is less clear in Europe, how-
ever, where some courts have held that linking 
is not copyright infringement, but other courts 
have disagreed.  The distinction appears to be 
whether the link is to the copyright owner’s 
own website or is to a third party’s infringing 
website.  The critical issue is whether the per-
son providing the link knew or should have 
